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Abstract
We study product innovation and imitation in the market of corporate underwriting with
a dynamic model where client switching costs and the bankers’ expertise in deal structuring
characterize the life cycle of a security. While the clientele loyalty allows positive rent extraction,
the superior expertise can account for the documented market leadership of the innovator. As
expertise on product structuring is acquired by imitators, the innovator’s market share advantage
decreases. Also, the speed of entry by imitators increases for later generation products. Our
predictions are consistent with well documented evidence on the market share leadership of
innovators. We also present new evidence from equity-linked and derivative corporate products
that supports the dynamic predictions of our learning model.
JEL Classi…cation: G24, L12, L89.
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11 Introduction
Investment banks have been at the forefront of …nancial innovation in the last two decades, in-
creasing the number of security designs that issuing …rms can use to raise new money. The volume
of cash that banks underwrite using these products has also taken an increasing proportion of the
overall underwriting market. But innovation is often followed by imitation and even large banks of
big reputations avoid expenditures in research anddevelopment and compete vis à vistheinnovator
with an imitation of the original product. Yet, the empirical evidence suggests quite strongly that
the developers of new securities are able to preserve a competitive advantage over their imitators.
Why thisis thecaseisstill an open question in the…nance…eld. It isimportant and timely to study
the source and the evolution of the developer’s advantage if we want to understand the incentives
of banks to innovate, how these incentives a¤ect the speed of innovation and, in turn, how the
protection of innovation through patent laws may a¤ect these incentives.1
Peter Tufano’s seminal empirical study of innovation in corporate products showed that in-
vestment banks that develop new corporate products enjoy a market share leadership over equally
reputed rivals (Tufano, 1989).2Thus, despite the fact that imitators are o¤ering similar products,
a signi…cant share of the issuing …rms are more likely to choose the innovator as their underwriter.
One reason they may have such a preference is that the imitator can underwrite deals with only
an imperfect version of the product. In fact, for many product innovations, the reverse engineering
often does not result in a perfect substitute (Toy, 2001). Similarly, in their study of the investment
banking industry, Dwight Eccles and Robert Crane argue that the skill to structure the issue of a
corporate security takes time to acquire (Eccles and Crane, 1988). These views suggest that the
innovator is e¤ectively the expert underwriter, and the competitors are imperfect imitators.
This paper argues that the innovator has an advantage over the imitator that consists of a
superior expertise in structuring a complex security for any given client. The innovator acquires
the expertise about the new security during its the development stage, whereas an imitator cannot
reverse-engineer it perfectly or acquire the innovator’s expertise instantly after the new security
is marketed. To back our claim we build a model of the underwriting market around this main
feature and then test the validity of its empirical predictions with the existing empirical evidence
of …nancial innovation, and with new evidence that we provide here.
As we mentioned before, to our knowledge very few researchers have proposed reasons why
…rms may have a preference for the innovator rather than the imitator.3Our model considers the
2fact that the imitators do not have the same expertise as the innovator initially but may acquire
it as more deals are being completed. Thus, the model provides a characterization of the timing
of the entry of imitators and the pricing behavior before and after imitation. It has distinctive
dynamic implications that are comparable with existing and new evidence on …nancial innovation.
In particular, as more issues of the innovative security areunderwritten and imitators perfect their
own expertise, the innovator’s advantage decreases and eventually disappears as the innovation
approaches a commodity product status. This dynamic pattern suggests that the life cycle of new
…nancial products usually involves the gradual erosion of the innovator’s pro…ts (see Van Horne,
1985).
The theoretical part of the paper is a duopoly model, i.e., an innovator vs. an imitator, that
gives the comparativestaticsresult that thesmaller the innovator’squality advantage the faster the
imitators enter the market and the faster the market shares of innovators and imitators converge.
Intuitively, the more highly structured is the product the harder it is to reverse-engineer and the
longer the innovator can maintain its market share advantage. To verify empirically these compar-
ative statics we look into innovations that can be classi…ed into product groups and generations of
productswithin a group according to therelationship ofa product to its predecessors (i.e., theprior
art). We …nd such type of innovations in the equity-linked and derivatives class of the Securities
Data Company New Issues Database. This class of products has become increasingly important,
not only as a fertileground for innovation in corporateproducts, but also as a largesource of funds:
between 1985 and 2002, …rms have raised over US$ 200 billion, which represents almost 16% of the
cash that was raised using common stock. For the case of equity-linked securities, some products
are radically innovative while others are only enhancements of previous products. Since a later
generation product builds on the prior security designs, i.e., is less innovative than a …rst genera-
tion product, it could be reverse-engineered more e¤ectively. Thus, the initial expertise advantage
of the …rst-mover is expected to be stronger in …rst generation products than on later generations.
Indeed, for the later generation products our model predicts faster imitation and faster market
share convergence than for earlier generation products. Interestingly, we …nd that the theoretical
predictions on the speed of imitation match the empirical evidence on equity linked securities that
we present.
Our paper is closely related to the work by Sugato Bhattacharyya and Vikram Nanda (Bhat-
tacharyya and Nanda, 2000). They highlighted …rst the role of switching costs in …nancial inno-
vation: if a potential innovator has already clients for whom switching banks is costly, then he
3can serve this clientele with prices over marginal costs, even when competitors are in the market
o¤ering identical products. Then, a broader or more loyal client base increases the incentives to
innovate. Switching costs are certainly important to promote innovation because they imply that
underwriting provided by two di¤erent banks cannot be substituted perfectly, thus ensuring that
even perfect imitation does not eliminate the innovator’s pro…ts. However, switching costs alone
do not eliminate the free-rider problem: regardless of the pro…tability of innovation, there is no
advantage of being an innovator. Ceteris paribus, any potential innovator would rather be an imi-
tator than develop the product himself. In other words, theadvantagebelongs to thesecond mover
rather than to the …rst in their model. Our model exhibits the developer’s expertise advantage
feature together with the switching costs feature. Innovators and imitators compete with products
that are di¤erentiated horizontally and vertically. The horizontal dimension represents the switch-
ing costs and the vertical dimension represents the innovator’s expertise in structuring deals. The
vertical dimension is crucial to account for thestylized facts in the literature and the new evidence
provided here. Namely, thedi¤erent expertiseadvantages across subsequent generations ofa family
of innovations accounts for the faster expected timing of entry of imitation and the faster speed of
convergenceofmarket sharesfor later generationsthat our data show. It is important to stressthat
other explanations that do not rely on the developer’s expertise can hardly explain the dynamic
pattern of the decreasing market share advantage of the innovator and the faster speed of entry in
equity-linked securities.
Our model can also address the interactions between the size of switching costs or the size of
initial clientelesandtheincentivestoinnovate. Asin themodel byBhattacharyyaandNanda, banks
with smaller initial clienteles may never innovate. In fact, we do see in thedata that competition in
derivative corporate products involves mostly the “bulge bracket” Wall Street banks. Within this
group of large banks, most banks do appear sometimes as leaders and other times as followers, and
rarely do we observe small banks participating as either innovators or imitators. Thus, while it is
clearthat innovatorscouldappearto havelargemarket sharesbecauseoftheirlargeinitial clienteles,
it is not clear why largebanks alsohavesmall market sharesasimitators. Recently, EnriqueSchroth
estimated thedemand function for a given underwriter and found that the leadership is systematic
to the innovator, even after controlling for the size of the clientele of the bank (Schroth, 2003).
An implication of the size of initial market shares is that a bank may appear in the long run to
monopolize the introduction of future generations. As his market share grows due to a successful
current innovation, his client base for future innovations increases. Morgan Stanley’s dominance in
4convertible preferred stock in the early and mid nineties is a notable example consistent with this
prediction.
Our analysis has implications too about the speed at which innovations are introduced. In-
novator’s may have an idea for a marketable security, but may not o¤er it as soon as they have
it. In our model, this happens because the arrival of issuing …rms is random, so even if the bank
has completed the design privately, there may not be any close clients looking for external …nance.
Underwriting the security with a distant client is not very pro…table because the client is switch-
ing away from his bank. Moreover, it triggers the competitor’s learning process by the imitators
too soon. Thus, our model predicts that innovators will wait for good clients to come to market,
or, market their innovations aggressively to their clients, or, alternatively, innovate based on their
clients’ capital structure targets.
The pro…ts of innovation in our model increase when imitators cannot learn too much informa-
tion about optimal product engineering from each deal. Banks will innovate more often in markets
whereinference about the optimal engineering by theimitator is clouded with a changing economic
environment, i.e., a higher volatility. Innovation should be more frequent in volatile market not
because in such a context …rmsdemand new risk hedging products but becausebanks that innovate
would expect larger …rst-mover advantages there. In the model by Bhattacharyya and Nanda, the
higher frequency ofinnovation in volatilemarkets isalso dueto a supply factor(Bhattacharyya and
Nanda, 2000). In their case, it is the increase in the cost to issuing …rms of delaying the adoption
of innovation.
John Persons and Vincent Warther propose a theory of the adoption of …nancial innovations
that explains some documented cases of boom and bust cycles (Persons and Warther, 1997). In
their model, issuing …rms are di¤erentiated in terms of their cost of adopting an innovation of
uncertain value. At every period, all …rms that have not yet been …nanced will choose to use the
innovation as a …nancing instrument if its expected value exceeds its cost. The expected value to
the non-adopters is updated after a noisy signal of the true value is revealed from those that had
adopted it. Since the precision of this signal would depend on the total number of adopters, they
can generate waves of adoption in equilibrium. Our model is di¤erent in several respects. In …rst
place, our model di¤ers in the timing: here one client is drawn independently at each time, while in
their model, all …rms are potential issuers every period. We chose to model the market this way in
order to exploit fully theavailable data on new issues ofcorporate derivatives: the data is recorded
deal by deal, and banks bid for each underwriting deal at a time. Therefore, the model can make
5predictions of the future expected market shares after each deal is completed. But most crucially,
their model abstracts from competition between rival banks while ours focuses precisely in the
demand for the underwriting services of di¤erent competing banks and the relative advantage of
the innovator over its imitator across time. Finally, in our model the size of the aggregate demand
for the new product is …xed every period (i.e., one client at a time). Allowing for changes in the
demand every period may not a¤ect signi…cantly our predictions in terms ofthe relative advantage
of one bank over the other, or the speed of entry by imitators.
Our analysis also addresses the e¤ects of the new legal environment that favors patents for
business methods innovations in the US. Josh Lerner has showed that there has been a sharp
increase since 1999 in the applications and awards for patents in the subclasses where …nancial
innovations are …led (Lerner, 2000), so it is natural to ask how patenting is going to change the
incentives to innovate and the overall pace of innovation in …nancial products. We use a simple
model where two banks race to develop the next security, and the …rst to arrive at the discovery
enjoys the …rst-mover advantage. The loser however, can share part of the rents of R&D because
he can reverse-engineer the innovator’s design. In this context, we …nd that some level of pro…t
sharing is optimal, since this softens the competition to be the winner of the innovation race.
The possibility to reverse-engineer perfectly makes free-riding too attractive and there is too little
R&D in equilibrium. On the other extreme, a patent regime is not optimal because banks try to
outspend their rivals since the patent race is a winner-take-all race, and there is too much R&D in
equilibrium. We argue that the current situation may have driven the …nancial services industry
further away from the optimal level of pro…t sharing than the previous situation without patents.
Robert Hauswald and Robert Marquezhaveasked what istheoptimal disclosurelevel that regu-
lators may want to forceon theinnovators of proprietary credit assessment technologies (Hauswald
and Marquez, 2003). In their model, the innovator screens better loan applicants and is therefore
more competitive in the credit market. They …nd then that it is also optimal to reveal some of the
innovator’s acquired skills to competitors so as to toughen competition for borrowing clients, and
increase their surplus. However, while some degree of pro…t sharing is optimal, they argue that
there is a rationale for patents if the regulator is able to choose the level of disclosure every time
after an innovation occurs. In such case, a regulator cannot commit credibly not to force full dis-
closure ex-post, and this a¤ecting severely theincentivesto innovate ex-ante. A patent system then
may be the only way to keep the regulator from forcing excessive disclosure. Our model di¤ersfrom
theirs becausethere is a race for the innovation, so an innovation ofa given aggregate value can be
6achieved at di¤erent R&D costs in equilibrium. Also, their rationale for patent protection is ruled
out in our setup because we do not havea regulator with full discretion to force any level of disclo-
sure after innovation. We believe this assumption is reasonable for corporate products innovation
given that the SEC does not have a policy of changing its rules of disclosure discretionally.
We proceed with Section 2, where we describe the elements of the model, and explain how
imitation may be imperfect. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium when the innovator and the
imitator have identical underwriting market shares before the innovation is introduced, and Sec-
tion 4 formalizesthe acquisition ofunderwriting expertise by the imitator. Section 5 pins down the
equilibrium pro…ts of innovation and discusses the incentives to innovate. Section 6 generalizes the
results to the case where the competitors have initially asymmetric client bases and reputation is
accumulated throughout the product’s life. Section 7 tests the predictions with existing and new
evidence found in theunderwriting market of equity-linked and corporatederivativeproducts. Sec-
tion 8 discusses the e¤ects of foreclosing imitation with a patent regime on the speed of innovation
and the expenditures in R&D. Section 9 summarizes brie‡y.
2 The Setup of the Model
2.1 The Underwriting Market
In thissection wemodel themarket ofcorporateunderwriting. Therearetwo typesofunderwriters:
the innovator and the imitator. Each type o¤ers its own variety of a corporate …nance product,
i.e., a structured security, that …rms can issue to raise funds. The innovator is the bank that …rst
developed a new security design and competes with the imitator to underwrite every issue of the
innovative security by a given …rm. Let the underwriters be indexed by i; the innovator is i = 0
and the imitator is i = 1: An underwriter is hired by an issuer to structure the deal and sell the
securities to investors. The underwriter charges its client a fee, i.e., the underwriting spread, for
such a service.
The game starts at period 0 when the innovator (i = 0) gets an idea about a new corporate
security design. The potential innovator can choose to develop and market the new security by
paying a …xed R&D cost, F0: As soon as it chooses to innovate, it starts underwriting issues of
the new security. After the innovator completes is …rst underwriting deal, information about the
security design is revealed. With this information, the other bank can develop a similar product
and become an imitator. We assume that the imitator can free-ride completely the R&D, that
7is, F1 = 0:4The innovator is a monopolist only for the …rst deal. After that deal, the presence of
imitation limits his market power as both banks compete in underwriting spreads.
The underwriting service provided by banks is di¤erentiated, both vertically and horizontally.
The vertical dimension measures the quality of the product: all other things constant, any issuer
derives a higher value if she hires an investment bank that provides a higher quality underwriting.
The horizontal dimension describes the preferences of issuers for a particular bank. Issuers are
“located” on a unit interval, and their mass is distributed over it following a given distribution.
For now we assume that the distribution of issuers is uniform over [0; 1] and relax this assumption
in Section 6. At every period nature draws the next …rm who will seek for an underwriting deal
from the said distribution. We assume that the two competing investment banks in this economy
o¤er di¤erentiated varieties and are located at the two extremes of the interval (without loss of




Figure 1: Location of banks and potential clients
Let the quality of underwriter i’s product be qi and assume that the preference for quality,
location and the price paid, pi; enter linearly into the …rm’s valuation of an underwriting deal.
Then, the values ofa client located at x of hiring either type ofbanker as its underwriter are given
by:
u0(x) = q0 ¡p0 ¡sx;
u1(x) = q1 ¡p1 ¡s(1¡x);
where s is the cost per unit of distance of choosing a variety located away from the preferred one.5
Note that with this setup each bank will have its own clientele of …nancing …rms. The value
to a …rm of adopting the product of bank 0 or 1 depends on relative prices, on the quality of
the product, but also on the proximity of the bank’s variety to its preferred one. The horizontal
dimension representsthen the degreeof loyalty that issuing …rmshaveto theavailable underwriters
8since a …rm always belongs to a given bank’s clienteleand it faces a cost ofswitching bankers. Thus,
hereafter we refer to s as the size of the switching cost or the loyalty of the client interchangeably.
Every timea …rm isdrawn, shechoosesits underwriter, i; to maximizethe valueofits contract,
ui: We assume that the issuing …rm has a reservation value normalized to zero and cannot delay
the…nancing decision. After a …rm is drawn, both banks compete in prices to sign an underwriting
deal with her. Given the …rm type, qualities, and switching costs, each banker’s per-deal pro…ts
are:
¼i =(pi ¡c)Di(x; p0; p1;x; q0;q1;s; t) (1)
for i = 0; 1: The term c represents the marginal cost of underwriting (e.g., SEC …ling, advertising,
legal fees) and t the order of the draw, i.e., thesecurity has a history of t¡1 deals. Only one bank





1 if u0(x) >u1(x);
0 otherwise,
D1 = 1 ¡D0:
At period zero, the expected pro…ts to the innovator are:
¦e






0(0) denotes the innovator’s expected pro…ts in the …rst deal, which he gets for sure being
still the only issuer. Note that most innovations in corporate security designs are …nite-lived. The
in…nite-horizon assumption is a natural way to model the problem if we introduce the probability
that the game continues for one more period as a discount factor, which we call (1¡±): To save in
notation wehaveexcluded the“puretime”discount factor. However, thiscanbeeasily incorporated
to the model if we interpret (1 ¡±) as the product of the probability of continuation and the pure
time discount.
2.2 Financial Innovation
An innovation is a new corporate security that a …rm can issue to raise money. Due to disclosure
regulations, the design of the new security is revealed to imitators. However, this design typically
has several parameters that have to be set for each deal. For example, among other things, a
PERCs (Preferred Equity Redemption Cumulative Stock) issue has to specify the conversion rate
of preferred to common shares as a function of the returns of common stock, by choosing a cap







PERCs (Preferred Equity Redemption Cumulative Stock)
 - Innovator: Morgan Stanley, 6/1991.
 - Imitators: Merryll Lynch, Dean Witter.
 - Mandatory Conversion in 3 years.
 - High dividend yield (>8%)
 - r between 25 - 40%.
Figure2: The conversion ratio ofPreferred Equity CumulativeStock (PERCS) as a function of the
returns of the underlying common stock.
A bank that wants to imitate PERCs can see what is the general structure of the product but
still does not know how to set optimally for his client the speci…c parameters of the security such
as caps, conversion rates and price. For this reason a client who decides to issue PERCs would
expect a higher quality of underwriting from the original developer of the security, all other things
being equal.
Similarly, generic equity-linked debt products must specify the stock or stock index whose
price is tied to the adjustable face value. Thus, to underwrite an issue of any given security, the
underwriter has to structure each deal by customizing theparameters speci…ed by the design.7Deal
customization has been well documented. It is depicted in testimonies by bankers collected by
10Eccles and Crane (Eccles and Crane, 1988). Recently, Schroth analyzes the structuring of equity-
linked deals and …nds a signi…cant variation across the parameters within same designs (Schroth,
2003).
We assume that the skill needed to customize deals is acquired with expertise. If the innovator
has superior expertise than the imitator he structures the deals better and, ceteris paribus, he
provides a higher quality underwriting. We let the investment banks’s expertise be q; the quality
parameter of the product. While the imitator can learn the design structure immediately and for
free, he may only be able to imitate the innovator’s new product imperfectly or with an inferior
customizing skill than the innovator. In such case, q0 > q1; and let ¢q ´q0¡q1 ¸0 be the quality
di¤erential.
3 Equilibrium
In the …rst deal, the innovator is a monopolist and makes a certain pro…t ¼M: After the …rst deal
the innovator loses part of its market power.
3.1 Monopoly
Since the innovator has monopoly power on its …rst deal, the highest price it can charge is the one
that makes the issuing …rm indi¤erent between underwriting the deal or not. If the reservation
value is zero then:
u0(x) = 0
) p0 =q0 ¡sx









To guarantee that the ex-post pro…t of the innovator and the imitator from a deal with any
potential client are positive, we need to assume that q1; which is smaller than q0; is large enough,
that is,
q1 ¸ c+s: (2)
113.2 Oligopoly
After the …rst deal, underwriters compete for the following client that wants to issue the new
security. Banks compete by undercutting prices until one of them reaches its marginal cost. De…ne
^ xas the client that, when o¤ered a deal priced at marginal cost by both banks, isindi¤erent between
either. That is, for
p0 = p1 =c;
^ x solves u0(^ x) = u1(^ x):
Solving, we obtain








Note that iftheinnovator’s quality advantage ishigh relative to the clientelee¤ect, i.e., ¢q >s,
then the “indi¤erent” client lies outside the unit interval, which means that innovatorgets thenext
deal for sure. Still, the presence of the imitative competitor puts a bound on the markup that the
innovator can obtain.
De…ne xsuchthat, forany client x< x, theinnovator can undercut the imitatorbelow marginal
cost and still get the deal (while making a pro…t). Thus, the range of clients of the innovator for
the next deal is:
x 2 [0; x) (3)
x = min (1; ^ x) (4)
Figure 3 illustrates the probability of obtaining the deal of the Innovator and of the Imitator as a
function of the quality advantage ¢q when s =1:
Consider a client in the region x 2 (0; x): Due to the preference for the innovator’s variety, the
innovator can undercut the imitator to its marginal marginal cost and attract the client with a
price p0 such that:
q0 ¡p0 ¡sx = q1 ¡c ¡s(1¡x)









Figure 3: Probability of obtaining the deal of Innovator and Imitator










= (x¡x2)s+x¢q =x((1 ¡x)s+¢q)
And the imitators expected one period pro…ts are:
q0 ¡c ¡sx = q1 ¡p1 ¡s(1¡x)









= (x¡x2)s+x¢q¡¢q =(1 ¡x) (xs+¢q)
The innovator’s expected pro…ts are higher, due to the higher quality. In fact, the di¤erence in




so for any positive quality di¤erential the innovator is always ex-ante better o¤ than the imitator.
13In the case of high advantage relative to switching costs:








In the case of low advantage:












































Figure 4: One Period Pro…ts of Innovator and Imitator as a function of quality advantage
Recall that if an imitator cannot reverse engineer the innovation perfectly, then ¢q >0: In this
case the innovator’s expected pro…ts per deal despite competition are greater than s
4: As the ¢q
decreases we move on the above …gure from right to left and the per deal expected pro…ts of the
innovator decrease while the per deal expected pro…ts of the imitator increase. As ¢q converges to
zero, both pro…ts converge to s
4 which is the a positive value, due to the client loyalty that allows
above marginal cost pricing. As the quality advantage vanishes for uniformly distributed clients
the probabilities of obtaining the deal converge to one half for both competitors.
14Note that assumption (2) guarantees the expected pro…t of the developer in the …rst deal is










Even iftheinnovator makesthe upcoming deal, thepresence ofimitation brings downward pressure
on prices and lowers the pro…t for the innovator.
The quality di¤erential is a crucial element of innovation in this model. The model exhibits the
typical free-rider problem in product innovation because the security design is disclosed publicly
and F1 < F0: However, deals have to be customized within the design of the product, and this
leaves room for quality di¤erences. In the next section we formalize how expertise is acquired as
deals are completed and the innovation develops into a commodity.
4 The Acquisition of Product Expertise
We now focus on the learning process that describes the dynamics of ¢q: We use the dynamics of
theexpertiseacquired by both competing banks to analyzethe underwriting game equilibrium and
make comparative statics predictions.
An imitator can improve his deal structuring from the moment he observes the new security.
He acquires product expertise as more deals on that security are completed in the market. Let
the expertise speci…c to a given security be summarized by the knowledge of a variable, a. To
understand better the meaning of a;consider the following factors that a¤ect the quality of the
underwriting service. In …rst place, theunderwriter must learn how to choosethe right parameters
that are best for di¤erent issuers. In second place, investment banks need to identify changes in
the tastes of investors or changes in market conditions and structure each issue accordingly to
maximize the proceeds. In third place, underwriters also provide advice to issuers on how to hedge
the liabilities or to invest the proceeds associated to the issue of the securities they engineer. In
fact, in some cases the underwriters may buy some of the issued shares, in which case they need to
understand the product’s e¤ect on the risk and returns of a portfolio.8Thus, we can think of a as a
mapping parameter of these changing conditions (clients, markets, investors, own investments) to
the optimal deal structure.
A higher quality is tied to a superior product expertise, which is itself a better knowledge of a:
Formally, product expertise is the precision of the information that the underwriter has about the
15unknown value of a: The prior density of a is normally distributed with variance A¡1. In the case
of the innovator, R&D provides him information about a through a signal:
z0 =a+"0; (8)
where the noise component "0 is a normally distributed variable with:
E("0) = 0; (9)
Var("0) = ¿¡1: (10)
Bayesian updating gives the posterior precision or the knowledge of the innovator about the
engineering choice a:
q0 = A +¿
we identify this precision with the quality q0 of the product engineered by the the innovator.
Even though we have illustrated product expertise as multidimensional, we prefer to treat a as
a scalar. We believe that making a a vector does not add any important insight, while treating it
as a scalar keeps our exposition parsimonious.
4.1 Learning by the Imitator
Before the new security is issued the …rst time, the precision of the imitator’s information about
the security engineering parameters a is also A¡1. After observing the …rst deal completed by the
innovator or any later deal underwritten by himself or by the innovator, the imitator is able to
update his information about a. In other words, the imitator observes a noisy signal z1; which
reveals information about a. Even if the design of the innovative security is disclosed publicly after
the …rst deal, the leakage of information about a is only partial and the imitator’s signal has an
additional normally distributed noise ´1 relative to the innovator’s information:
z1 = (a+"0) +´1;
where E(´1) = 0;
and Var(´1) = §¡1:
Note that § is the precision of the imitator’s signal beyond the incompressiblecomponent (a+"0),
i.e., how much is revealed after each deal is completed and a signal is extracted. Let ¿1(t) be the
16imitator’s precision or his product quality after observing t deals. The quality di¤erential between
the products is equal to the di¤erence in precision:
¢q(t) =¿0 ¡¿1(t)






We prove this Lemma in the appendix. The quality di¤erence decreases and converges to zero










Theimitator’sentry coincidesby de…nition with therealization ofhis…rst deal. Thedynamicsof
the quality advantage, allows us to characterize the timing of the entry. From (6), the probability
of entry becomes positive as soon as ¢q(t) becomes smaller than s. As long as ¢q(t) > 0; the
innovator has a higher probability of getting the next deal. This advantage of the innovator is
decreasing in time. It follows from (12) that his expected advantage disappears faster if the initial
advantage ¢q(0) is smaller and switching costs s are bigger.
The dynamicpattern of ¢q iscrucial to distinguish thepredictionsofthis model from modelsof
horizontal di¤erentiation only. Ifimitation isperfect, theloyalty of the client base may still provide
the required incentive to innovate, as in the model of Bhattacharyya and Nanda (Bhattacharyya
and Nanda, 2000). However, switching costs alone predict that imitation is immediate and that
the expected market shares are stationary.
An important measure of the innovator’s advantage is the number of deals after which his
superior initial expertise is reduced by half. This measure of the “half life” of the advantage is







4.2 Subsequent Generations of Products
In some equity linked securities we observe that the design of some products relies on earlier ones.
In particular, new generationsareimprovementsoftheir older versions. Weincorporate this feature







DECS (Dividend Enhanced Convertible Stock)
 - Innovator: Salomon Brothers, 6/1993.
 - Imitators: Lehman Brothers.
 - Mandatory Conversion in 3 years.
 - Lower dividend yield.
 - r between 20 and 22%.
0
Figure 5: The conversion ratio of Dividend Enhanced Convertible Stock (DECS) as a function of
the returns of the underlying common stock.
Suppose that a bank invents a product that is an enhancement of an earlier product charac-
terized by quality ¿. We assume that this enhancement improves the quality by ¿0 that the new
product has maximum quality of
¿ +¿0
After a new product that relies on earlier ones is issued, second generation process of learning-
by-doing can start. The only di¤erence with the framework presented above is that the competing
banks (innovators and imitators) start to acquire knowledge from the precision of the earlier gen-
eration, ¿ (the prior art). For example, Dividend Enhanced Convertible Stock, or DECS (Figure
5), are a second generation innovation derived from the PERCs, which have one degree of freedom
less (Figures 7 and 8 illustrate generations following PERCS and DECS).
The security design of subsequent generations is not as innovative as the design of the elders.
In other words, the maximum potential value that a new security adds to its issuer is decreasing
18in the generation number of the security. This implies that
¿0 < ¿
or since (for any t) ¢q(¿; t) is decreasing in ¿:








a given generation’s product quality gap is larger than the quality gaps of the products of later
generations.
4.2.1 Speed of Entry
The number of deals done by the innovator after which the imitator closes his …rst imitative deal
is a random variable that depends on how innovative or hard to imitate is the original product.
More precisely, consider the probability distribution that the imitator closes his …rst deal anytime
after N ¡1 deals closed by the innovator. This is a cumulative probability function equal to:
Pr(N) = 1¡¦N¡1
t=1 (xt)

















Since for every t, ¢q(t) is increasing in the initial advantage ¢q(0), than for every N, Pr(N)
decreases in ¢q(0): This implies that:
Proposition 1 The probability distribution of the time of entry of the imitator at or after the
N-th deal is …rst order stochastically dominated by the distribution of the time of the entry when
the initial expertise advantage is larger.
This implies, for instance, that the expected time of entry of an imitator is lower the lower the
initial disadvantage. This stochasticdominancecan beveri…ed in the data by comparingthesample
distribution of thetimesof entry ofcompetitors acrosssubsequent generationsofinnovations within
the same family. Indeed, as weargued later generation products should have lower initial expertise
advantages relative to earlier ones.
194.2.2 Equilibrium Market Shares
The expected market share of the innovator after M deals plus the monopolistic deal (t = 0) is:
MS0(M) =
Ã
























Theexpected market share ofthe innovator is always larger than the expected market share of the
imitator and the di¤erence decreases with the “age” of the security, i.e., with M :










Since¢q(t) ·sfort ¸N then, at any given period M; ifthe innovator’s expertiseis higheror if
thespeed oflearning ofthe innovatoris smallerorif the switching cost are smaller, then the market
share of the innovator becomes relatively larger than the imitator’s. This happens for two reasons.
First, the possible entry of the imitator happens later (after more deals are underwritten by the
innovator, i.e., a larger N). Second, even after the “entry” of competition, the probability that the
imitator obtains the deal in any given period is smaller (larger ¹ x). Clearly, MS0(M) ¡MS1 (M)
converges to zero.
Proposition 2 If next generation products are associated with decreasing incremental innovations
then market share convergence occurs faster for later generations.
5 The Incentives to Innovate
De…ne N as the …rst deal in which the imitator has a positive probability of obtaining it, that is
given (12):










This threshold N is higher the higher the expertise advantage of the innovator and the smaller the
switching cost (client loyalty) and slower the information spillover (learning of the imitator).
20The total expected pro…ts from innovating must account for four terms: the development cost,
the expected pro…ts from the …rst deal, the expected pro…ts from the periods where the expertise


































The innovator’s total pro…ts and his incentives to innovate increase with his initial expertise ad-
vantage ¢q(0) and decrease with §; the amount of information that the imitator learns after every
deal underwritten for that security by any bank.
The total expected pro…ts from imitating account the expected pro…ts from the period when













The imitator’s total pro…ts decrease with his initial quality disadvantage ¢q(0) and increase with
§.
Since the innovator’s pro…ts decrease in §; they have incentives to innovate in markets where
the precision of the updating process by imitators is smaller. In other words, they will innovate
where imitators can extract less information from observing each deal. Such will be the case of
highly volatile markets, wherethe changes in theeconomic environment will prompt changes in the
engineering of each deal, given the product design. This clouds the inference that imitators make
about the optimal mapping ofthedeals’ parameters. Innovation should be morefrequent in volatile
markets not because in such a context …rms demand new risk hedging products but because banks
have bigger …rst mover advantages.
In this model the innovator does not have a choice of when to introduce the new product.
Clearly, if an innovator develops a new security he may wait to market it when the demand for the
product is high. In the context of this model, the innovator may have the design ready but may
wait until the client who is in the market is one that can be charged the highest underwriting fee.
21Since clients are drawn independently, the innovator’s equilibrium pro…ts increase if the …rst deal
is with a more loyal client, i.e., a client closer to location 0. Thus, an innovator with a new security
design has an incentive to wait until his most loyal client is in need of …nance.
Waiting for the most loyal client can be too costly if there is a risk that other competitors
may come up with the same innovation. Thus, an underwriter with a new design has incentives
to market the innovation to its most loyal client base. Alternatively, banks may tailor the design
of their innovations to suit best the needs of their most loyal clientele. For example, the design of
their products may be destined to meet the targets of their client’s capital structure, or their needs
to save taxes.
5.1 Speed of Innovation
We argued above that later generation products typically rely more on prior art and hence can be
imitated fasterand moreaccurately. Oneimplication of thiswasthat thehalf-life oftheinnovator’s
advantage is shorter for later generation products. Also in general next generation products are
improvements on previous ones. Thus, the actual life span of a security design depends on the
speed at which the next generation arrives.
To understand how the life span of a security depends on its generation number, consider
this simple setup. Assume that in each period any given bank has some exogenous probability
of discovering a later generation security, namely the improvement over the current one. Let the
probabilities be ±0 and ±1, which are di¤erent in general, for innovator and imitator: We can think
that ±0 > ±1 because the innovator has an expertise advantage in the engineering of the current
product that gives him a lead in the research and development for a later generation product. The
probability that some bank innovates in any given period is
1¡(1 ¡±0)(1¡±1) ´±:
With later generation products, the initial advantage in product engineering of the innovator
overtheimitator decreases. In thissamespirit and for thesame reason we can assume also that the
one period chance that the imitator is able to develop a new improved product, ±1; gets closer to
the innovator’s chance, ±0
9. This implies that the probability that an improved security is created,
±, is increasing in the generation number. Since the earlier product is replaced (“cannibalized”) by
its improvement, we have that later generation products should last on average less or be replaced
faster. Indeed, if ±0 and ±1 are constant within a generation, then the expected number of deals
22(or, alternatively, time periods) before a given product is replaced is 1
±:10We conclude that later
generation products last less, i.e., that new products arrive faster or after less deals of the previous
ones.
Note that, all other things constant, imitators can enter the market faster for later generations.
However, the shortening of the life cycle of later generation securities decreases the chances that
imitators complete their …rst deal. Thus, while it is true that, conditional on being imitated, later
generations are imitated faster, it is not clear whether we should see more or less frequent imitation
in latergenerations. Iftheexpected lifecycleofa security shortensfaster(slower) than theexpected
imitation time, then we would expect less (more) imitation later in a sequence. This isan empirical
issue that we explore later in the paper.
6 Client Base Heterogeneity and Reputation E¤ects of Innovation
We assumed that the potential clients were uniformly distributed on the unit interval to explore a
situation where no bank had an advantage over the other prior to the creation of the new security.
After the innovation comes to lifethe innovator has an advantage over theimitator that eventually
fades. In fact, with uniformly distributed clients the situation in the long run returns to the equal
sharing of the market, just like before the innovation occurred.
In this section we depart from that equal advantage benchmark and explore the dynamics of
the …rst mover advantage when the two competitors do not have a client base of the same size to
begin with. To model this in a simple way, we assume that clients are distributed on the unit line
according to a density function of the following kind:
f®(x) =®x®¡1 0 ·x· 1
where ® is a positive real parameter. This type of distribution is a subclass of the beta family and
it allows us to capture the following features. For ® < 1 the Innovator (located at 0) has a client
base advantage, for ®> 1 the innovator (located at 1) has the client base advantage and for ®= 1
weare back in the uniform benchmark caseof equal client bases. Notethat despitethenon-uniform






who is indi¤erent in equilibrium between both banks
does not change, what changes is how many (the measure of) clients are located to his left and to
his right.
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In the case of high product expertise advantage:









In the case of low advantage:






































Proposition 3 A larger initial clientele of the innovator relative to the imitator, results in higher
innovator’s pro…ts from the new security and lower pro…ts from imitation.
This proposition is proved in the appendix. From it we learn that the initial client base can
have an important e¤ect on the incentives to innovate. Everything else being equal, it may not
be pro…table for a bank with a smaller initial client base to develop a new product that will later
be imitated, whereas it may be pro…table for a bank with a larger initial client base. As a result,
banks with larger client bases should innovate more often.
The above argument brings us to the relation between innovation and reputation. It is often
argued that in the …nancial sector there are returns to being a leader rather than a follower. Many
…rms prefer to be clients of a bank that innovates more frequently that other banks. This e¤ect can
be captured in this model if we assume that every innovation makes ® decrease. If the potential
developerof a new cutting edgeproduct can expand itsclient base, i.e., gain additional clients to do
other regular with asa result ofenhanced reputation, then it has an additional incentiveto develop
the product. Not only that, this innovation-reputation e¤ect on the client base can feed back on
itself and spur even more innovation. If a bank by creating a new product can later increase its
client base for future innovations, it will have higher expected pro…ts from its next innovations,
because he will be serving a larger initial potential set of clients.
247 Empirical Evidence Related to the Model
7.1 Summary of Predictions
Now we address how the predictions of the model are consistent with the evidence found in the
issues ofcorporatederivatives. Let us start by summarizing brie‡y the empirical implicationsofthe
model that can be tested with existing evidence and that we verify with our additional evidence:
Prediction 1 The market share for the innovator’s variety of the product is larger than for an
imitator’s and the di¤erence is decreasing with time.
Prediction 2 If an innovation is an improvement (i.e. is a later generation) of a previous one,
the market share advantage of the innovator is smaller and decreases faster than the earlier
generation.
Prediction 3 Later generation securities are imitated faster than earlier generations.
To test these predictionswe will use data from theSecurities Data Company’s on-linedatabases
of …nancial transactions. We useall the private and public o¤erings of equity-linked and derivative
corporate securities in the New Issues database and record characteristics such as the name of
the issuer, the principal issued, the name of the underwriter and the dates. There are 665 of
such issues from 1985 until December of 2002. The issues are done using 51 di¤erent securities
(innovations) by 30 di¤erent lead underwriters. Not all banks compete in all products markets, so
there are 98 di¤erent bank-security couples. As we argued above, the complexity of the design of
corporate derivatives, rather than standard debt or equity, makes it more appropriate to evaluate
the predictions of a model with di¤erent expertise between underwriters. We also refer to the
results found by Schroth, in his empirical study that uses the same database (Schroth, 2003). We
also use Tufano’s results as a benchmark to compare our predictions (Tufano, 1989).
Other prediction ofthe model wasthat later generation products should beshorter lived. Addi-
tionally, we will verify empirically if imitation is less frequent or not due to shorter living securities,
or if early generation innovators are able to maintain their status as innovators or later generation
products.
257.2 Product Groups and Sequences of Innovations
Equity-Linked securities were classi…ed into product groups (or “families”) and generations within
these groups by Schroth (Schroth, 2003). Each one of the 51 di¤erent corporate derivatives in
the SDC database is considered as an innovation since for each one there is a unique feature that
distinguishes it from everything that already existed. Each security has its generation number,
which is their order of appearance within its product group. The innovator of a security is de…ned
as the lead underwriter of the …rst o¤er ever. Any other bank underwriting deals using the same
security is called an imitator.11
Table 1 compares the 11 di¤erent product groups for corporate derivatives. Some innovations
spurthedevelopment offurtherimprovementswhileothersdo not. Familieswith thelargest number
of improvements (later generations) have been those of convertible preferred equities, and the tax-
saving perpetual or convertible securities. Innovations in more standard debt products (RISRS) or
zero-coupon convertibledebt (LYONS) brought about relatively largeandlong lasting underwriting
markets but do not seem to have provided a fertile ground forsubsequent development. The second
and third columns of this table suggest that product groups with longer sequences of innovations
seem to be associated with more competitors and more innovators. These are expected features of
a fertile product group, in which during the sequence more information about the products would
have di¤used from innovators to potential competitors.
7.3 Evidence on Market Share Dominance
The studies by Tufano (Tufano, 1989) and Schroth (Schroth, 2003) have characterized the product
market share dominance of corporate securities innovators. From Tufano’s study, it is clear that
the innovator’s average share of all the deals done with any given innovation is larger than any
of the imitators’ average share. Thus, our …rst prediction is veri…ed for all corporate securities
innovations between 1971 and 1989. Using the equity-linked and corporate securities data, Schroth
estimates the demand for the innovators’ and imitators’ varieties at any point in the securities life
cycle. In …rst place, he con…rms that, on average the market demand for the innovator’s variety is
bigger than for the imitator’s in an arbitrary time period. This is a more direct test to our model
since it is actually a consistent estimation of the demand function rather than a consistency check
through the observed the market shares.
Schroth’s study also measures the market share advantage over time periods. Our second and
26third predictions are also veri…ed in the resultsofthis study: thedi¤erence between theinnovator’s
and the imitators demand is decreasing in time, and the time required for convergence is smaller
for later generations. Table 2 summarizes the results of these two studies.
7.4 The Speed of Imitation and Product Life
Prediction 3 states that imitation is expected to be faster in later generations. Figure 6 plots the
empirical cumulativefunction of the speed at which a security isimitated. The speed ofimitation is
measured by the number of thedeal, in chronological order, at which a given security was imitated.
The dotted line is the CDF corresponding to those imitated securities that were …rst generation
products, i.e., the …rst product in a sequence of related innovations. The solid line is the CDF of
the speed of imitation of products that appear in the sequence after the …rst generation. In this
…gure we can see that the empirical CDF of the speed of imitation for late generation securities
…rst-order stochastically dominates the one for …rst generation securities, con…rming the increased
speed at which the former are imitated.
Figure 6 compares the speed of imitation measured by the number of deals. To get a more
precise assessment of the speed of entry across di¤erent generations, we …t a hazard rate model
where the survival time is the time in days before a given security is imitated. We form a panel
consists of all the deals from the second to the …rst imitation of each imitated security. The time
elapsed between each deal and the …rst one is coupled with the time invariant covariates that we
include in the following speci…cation:
¸i =expf¡(¯0 +¯1 ¤ generation numberi +¯2 ¤ size of first deali +"g; (16)
where ¸i is the probability that security i is imitated immediately after time t (measured in days)
given that it has not been imitated by time t: The size of the …rst deal is used as a control for
the expected size of the market at the time the security is introduced. The larger the expected
market, the larger the incentives that imitator would have to introduce their varieties faster. We
estimatetheparameters¯0;¯1; and¯2 by maximum likelihood, and their estimated standarderrors
are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and correlation within securities in the same
product group. We compute these estimates using three di¤erent distribution functions for the
error term, " : Weibull, Exponential and Log-normal.
The …rst three columns of Panel A in Table 3 show the estimates for the parameters in (16),
omitting the size of the …rst deal as a control. The …t for the Weibull or the Exponential versions
27Figure 6: Plot of Empirical Cumulative Density Functions for the Speed of Imitation Conditional
on the Generation Number of the Product
of the model is very poor. While higher generation numbers are associated with larger hazard
rates, and thus, faster expected time of imitation, these are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Moreover, the joint hypotheses that all parameters are zero cannot be rejected. The Lognormal
version, though, …ts thedata much better. We can reject the null that all parameters are zero, and
in this case the an increase by one generation increases the speed at which the security is imitated.
Augmenting thespeci…cation with thesizeofthe…rst deal does no changetheinferencemadein the
previous case. We seethat the Weibull and Exponential models are a poor …t, while the lognormal
…ts the data much better (the Wald statistic has a p-value of 0.02). In all three columns the sign
of ¯1 is negative, but it is only signi…cantly di¤erent from zero (with more than 95% con…dence)
in the lognormal case. Figure 9 illustrates the survival probabilities, i.e., the probability that a
security is not yet imitated implied by the estimates of the lognormal model. Note also that the
larger the …rst deal of every imitated security, the shorter the time it will take, on average, for
28imitators to enter themarket. TheExponential model may not …t the data well because it assumes
thehazard function is constant. Theassumption of monotonicity in the hazard function implicit in
the Weibull seems to be not borne in the data also: the implied increase of the speed of imitation
along the earlier generations may be too high relative to what we observe.
Panel B shows the estimated median times to the arrival of the …rst imitative deal, conditional
on thegeneration number ofthe innovation. Wecomputethese estimates at four di¤erent measures
of the sample distribution of the size of the …rst deal: all the quartiles and the mean. We use the
parameters in the last column of Panel A. In this case, the estimated time of entry of imitation is
given by 1
b ¸: At the median …rst deal size, the median imitation time is almost a year. The median
imitation time decreases to just over six-months by the …fth generation. For the third quartile of
the…rst deal size, the times are just over a half of these. For example, a tenth generation security’s
predicted median time of imitation is less than two months. This is also depicted in Figure 10.
Table 4 summarizes further characteristics of early and late generation products. The …rst row
con…rms a result found by Schroth: the innovator’s market share is larger for a …rst generation
innovator than for later generation innovators (Schroth, 2003).12In consistency with the previous
results, thesecond row of Table 4 shows that we see that later generation products, if imitated, are
imitated on average much faster than early generation products.
In Section 5.1, weargued that thepredictions of the half-lifeoftheinnovator’s advantage across
generations could not be veri…ed from the data because a product typically disappears because a
next generation replaces it. Thus, the observed number of deals is rather a measure of the speed of
next generation innovations. Weargued that the instantaneous probability of discovery of the next
innovation by eitherbank shoulddecreasealong thesequenceofinnovationsifnext generationswere
marginally decreasing improvements of quality of the previous ones, and if banks acquired more
expertise about the product class. Table 4 shows how the life cycle of …rst generations and later
generations di¤er. Measured by the total number of deals, it is clear that products that improve
on the …rst generation are, on average, shorter lived.
We haveseen that imitation occurs faster in later generations, if the product is imitated. How-
ever, one may ask why are some products imitated and why are others not. In fact, only 18 of
the 51 innovations in this sample were imitated. Table 5 addresses this concern by showing the
distributions of imitated and non-imitated products conditional on whether these are a …rst or a
later generation product. It shows that …rst generation products are signi…cantly more likely to be
imitated than later generation products. In fact, we can reject thenull hypothesis ofno association
29between the imitation and the generation number with a con…dence level of 95%. Most likely, this
is because, as we saw earlier, later generation products become shorter lived and thus it is less
likely to see that an imitator completes its …rst deal, even if it takes less deals for him to do so.
7.5 Who are the Innovators?
Investment banks that have large clienteles may have a captive market for their new corporate
products and this may provide stronger incentives to innovate. In fact, if switching costs were the
only source of monopolist rents then we would expect the same banks to innovate very frequently
along thesequence. Further, if innovation increases the reputation of a bank as an underwriter, the
e¤ect of initial clientele on the incentives to innovate are magni…ed, predicting a persistence in the
selection of the innovator: banks that develop the …rst generation would be morelikely to continue
developing improvements, while other banks are always “relegated” to the role of imitators.
Table 6 shows that, on the contrary, a signi…cant share of the later generation innovations are
done by banks that did not develop the group’s …rst generation. This table takes the 61 combi-
nations of groups and banks in the data and shows how the number of innovations is distributed,
conditional on the banks being the group innovator or not. Of the 50 banks that were not the
group innovator, 22 innovate at least once after the …rst generation has been introduced. More
precisely, of the 39 innovations that appear after the …rst generation, 33 are not introduced by the
group innovator.
As wehaveseen, group innovatorsmay innovateor imitatelatergenerations. In Table7 weshow
that the average group market share of the group innovator decreases sharply when the group has
more than one generation. In other words, in longer sequences of innovations, the group innovator
does not seem to dominate its competitors as well as when in shorter ones. This is also con…rmed
by the negative, albeit weak, estimated correlation between the group innovator’s share and the
length of the product chain (the number of generations).
We look further into the group market shares by …tting a linear regression of a given bank’s
shareofdeals in a given product group on a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the bank is the
group innovator, thenumberofgenerations in the group and thetotal numberof innovations by the
bank in that group. Table 8 reports the least squares parameter estimates and the Huber/White
estimates of their standard errors. All of these parameters are statistically di¤erent from zero
with a signi…cance level of 0.01. All other things constant, developing the …rst product in the
chain is associated with capturing a bigger share of the overall number of deals in the group. The
30number of accumulated innovations matters and is positively associated with market shares. The
interpretation would be that in a product group with a given numberof generationsa bank that has
been always an imitatorhas, on average, a smallershare ofthe deals than had it been theinnovator
of some of the products. This fact is consistent with Tufano’s evidence and the …rst prediction of
our model, i.e., being the product innovator matters (Tufano, 1989).
We also …nd that on a group that is larger by one generation, the group innovator has, on
average, asharethat isalmost 2 percentagepointssmaller. Thisisan important fact that apotential
group innovator may consider strategically in his innovation decision: he will expect his market
dominance to weaken if the product introduced is likely to be followed by many improvements.
Tables 9 and 10 provide some additional illustration of the patterns of innovation summarized
so far. Tables 9 lists the innovators and imitators in the family of Perpetual, Deferrable-Income
Securities. The group innovator is Goldman Sachs, who managed to introduce three more inno-
vations of this type. However, Lehman Brothers also introduced three new products later in the
sequence. Morgan Stanley and Smith Barney appear only as imitators in this group, and Merril
Lynch, who imitates frequently early in thesequence, …nally appears with oneinnovation in thelast
generation of the group. In the group of Index-Tied, Principal Appreciation Securities (Table 10),
we see that Morgan Stanley is the group innovator but does not innovate more in the same group.
In this group we do see some persistence in the leadership by Merril Lynch, with four consecutive
innovations. Lehman Brothers innovates late after being an imitator earlier, and Goldman Sachs
appears rather frequently as an imitator but never an innovator.
7.6 Further comments
Besides switching costs and expertise advantages, we …nd in the literature one more explanation
of why patents are not necessary for …nancial innovation. Vikram Nanda and Yeongkul Yun have
argued that banks coordinate their R&D e¤ort and act as a research joint venture to overcome the
free-riding incentives that ultimately eliminates the incentives to innovate(Nanda and Yun, 1995).
Webelieve, however, that this hypothesis does not apply to our data set and the types of securities
described in this paper. In …rst place, our data set and theirs have only one security in common.
Second, of the 662 underwriting deals using equity-linked and derivative corporate securities only
13 are underwritten jointly by two lead underwriters. In fact, only once has the underwriting
leadership ever been shared in the …rst issue of a security.
318 Patents, Welfare and Innovation
The analysis developed in this paper is relevant to the discussion of the e¤ects of the new legal
environment that favors patents for business methods and formulas in the US. Innovations in
…nancial products fall in this category and, as Josh Lerner showed, there has been a dramatic
increase since 1999 in the applications and awards for patents in the subclasses where …nancial
innovations are …led (Lerner, 2000). Clearly, there is not yet enough data available to analyze the
e¤ects of the State Street case ex-post.13However, it is interesting to try to predict how patenting
is going to change the bene…ts of investment banks and the overall pace of innovation in …nancial
products. Below we compare the scenario described in this paper, where the innovator maintains
an advantage over his imitators without patents, to a scenario in which the innovator is allowed to
protect his innovation with a patent and eliminate imitation completely.
To address this comparison wepropose the following parsimoniousmodel of an innovation race.
Let time be continuous and start at date 0, when banks must choose the hazard rate of the next
innovation, i.e., the probability that they will discover the next innovation immediately after time
t, given that no bank has innovated yet. Let there be two banks, i = A and B and call hi ¸ 0 the
hazard rate for bank i:14 Assume that the cost of racing is an increasing and convex function of
the hazard rate, i.e., for i = A and B;
e(hi) > 0;




Note that this speci…cation produces results identical to one where the banks have to choose how
much to spend on R&D at time zero, and the hazard rate is a concave function of the amount
spent. The common essential aspect of either setup is that the returns to R&D are diminishing.
Let ti bethe(random) timeat which bank i discoversa new …nancial product. Thenet expected










e¡rti if ti =min(tA;tB);
ve¡rtj if ti = max(tA;tB):
(17)
and r is the time discount factor. Note that tA =tB is a zero probability event.
32The form of the payo¤s in (17) summarizes the central idea of this paper. Imitation cannot be
foreclosed with a patent, yet the innovator has a …rst mover advantage and makes positive pro…ts
Theimitatorscan share part of the pro…ts from innovation though. Thus, thehighest possible gains





then the bank that discovers the new
product …rst has the bigger gain always. The variable v denotes then the amount of pro…t sharing
between the innovator (the …rst developer) and the imitator (the late developer). Better quality of
imitation is denoted by a higher v and thus imitators get a larger share of V: In the extreme case
of perfect and immediate imitation, v would be closeto V
2 and we would have symmetric sharing of
the pro…ts. In the other extreme case of patent protection we would have v =0 and all the pro…ts
are reaped by the innovator, i.e., we would have a winner-takes-all race.
Note that we have assumed here that the cumulative revenue of both …rms is the constant
Ve¡rt; regardless of how it is shared. However, the total revenue may change depending on the
legal environment. With patents, the net aggregate revenue is reduced by thesigni…cant legal costs
of patent …ling and enforcement, whereas in the case of free imitation the aggregate revenue is
reduced because competition makes issuers share part of the revenue through lower underwriting
fees. The latter reduction should be smaller, though, if banks’ clienteles are more loyal. Indeed,
according to Battacharyya and Nanda the e¤ects of client loyalty or switching costs are signi…cant
enough to makesomenon patentableinnovations pro…tablein thebanking business (Bhattacharyya
and Nanda, 2000). The upcoming results will still hold if thecumulative net revenueofboth banks
does not change drastically from the case of a patent regime to the case of a free imitation regime.
We analyze now how the pro…ts from innovation change as the amount of pro…t sharing, v;






















taking hB as given. Bank B solves a symmetric problem.
Proposition 4 There is a unique equilibrium to this innovation race. The equilibrium is symmet-
ric, i.e., hA = hB = h. In the equilibrium, a higher degree of pro…t sharing implies a smaller rate
of innovation, i.e., h is decreasing in v.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium allows us to do comparative statics. The closer we are to a
33winner-takes-all situation in the race, i.e., closer to the case of racing for a patent, the banks will
spend moree¤ort or R&D resources in equilibrium. If thedegree ofpro…t-sharing, v; increases then
banks will invest less and the discovery will happen later on average. Hence, the introduction of
patents predicts faster and, thus more frequent, innovations. But the other important question is
whether banks are better o¤ with patents and more innovation than without patents. To answer





Hence, there is a unique value of h that maximizes the indirect utility of either bank in the race.
Let this value be h¤: Since h is monotone in v; then there is also a unique level of pro…t-sharing
that maximizes the expected pro…ts of the racing banks net of R&D. However, wecan show that a
patent regime, which is the case where v =0; does not implement the optimal speed of innovation
in the race. In fact, wecan show that the winner-takes all aspect of the race makes banks too eager
to win the prize, so they overinvest in R&D, i.e., h(0) >h¤:
Proposition 5 A patent regime does not implement the optimal speed of innovation in the race
where the returns to R&D are decreasing. Moreover, it makes banks overinvest.
The proof is in the appendix. Intuitively, patent protection increases the prize of winning and
decreases the price of losing the race to the extreme where the winner takes it all, i.e., V: O¤ the
equilibrium, each banks tries to spend more than the other to try to win the race. In equilibrium,
both banks spend too much. As v increases and the gains are shared to a larger extent, spending
decreases in the unique equilibrium and we get closer to the optimum. If the amount of pro…t
sharing, v; is too large however, we get to the other side of the peak and we have suboptimal
investment in R&D because of a free-riding problem. If imitation pro…ts are high enough, then
o¤ the equilibrium, each bank would rather spend less than the competitor. In equilibrium, both
banks spend the same but less than the optimal amount.
To summarize, the optimal level of innovation from the point of view of competing banks is
obtained if the bank that happens to innovate gets most but not all the pro…ts from innovation.
Some level of pro…t sharing is desirable to soften the competition to be the …rst one to develop
the innovation. This may have been the case for the securities we have described in this paper,
which could not be patented until recently. According to this analysis the recent introduction of
patent protection and the winner-takes-all aspect it brings creates incentives to overspend in R&D.
34In fact, it ispossiblethat the current situation may befurther away from theoptimal level ofpro…t
sharing than the previous situation without patents.
In this setup the incentives provided by patent protection are too extreme and implement a
suboptimal investment in R&D. But certainly, patents have other e¤ects of uncertain magnitude
and direction. On the demand side, more innovation may bene…t issuing …rms by making more
varieties of securities available to them. However, issuing fees faced would be higher due to the
legal monopolistic. The net e¤ect on welfare is uncertain and would deserve closer scrutiny. In our
model, this e¤ect is absent because there perfect price discrimination is possible: the valuation of
the client for the type of security is known by all banks. Thus, the value that each borrowing …rms
derives from issuing any variety is equalized in equilibrium, so the speed of innovation only a¤ects
the banks.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that the development process of new corporate products endows
innovators with superior expertise in the structuring of deals for potential issuing …rms. This
featureis consistent with somestylized facts in the…nancial innovation literature. Namely, that the
innovator has, ceteris paribus, a market share advantage in themarket developed by his innovation,
and that thisadvantagedisappearswith time. Beyond theexisting evidence(Tufano, 1989, Schroth,
2003) we presented additional evidence on innovations developed more recently. The evidence on
innovations in equity-linked and corporate derivative products allowed us to identify families of
innovations and di¤erent generations within them. We noticed that the innovator’s advantage was
smaller and shorter lived for later generations products. Our model is consistent, not only with
the existing static evidence, but also with the dynamic patterns that the equity-linked securities
innovations exhibit.
The expertise advantage of theinnovator that emerges from this evidence makes the innovation
more pro…table. The innovator is more likely to recoup the development cost and have a positive
pro…t from theinnovation despitetheabsenceofpatent protection. TheresolutionoftheState Street
Case, in which theUS SupremeCourt decided to uphold a patent for a …nancial business method in
1999 has caused an arms race like run on patents by securities …rms (Lerner, 2000 & 2004), which
has received substantial press coverage recently. Our work has concluded that when banks race for
the next innovation, a certain degree of spill-over to the losing rivals is desirable, and State Street
35may have given incentives to spend excessively in R&D costs, besides raising signi…cantly the legal
costs of patenting every new product often for mere defensive reasons. Wether State Street may
have introduced welfare improving incentives as well is too early to tell. The e¤ects of State Street
on the amount of innovation and its pro…tability for investment banks remain to be seen.
36Figure Captions
Figure 1
This …gure illustrates thetypeof imperfect competition in ourmodel ofthe market of corporate
underwriting. Issuers lie along a unit interval according to their degree of loyalty to both banks.
The two underwriters are located at the extremes, and the closer is an issuer of type x to a given
bank, the more loyal it is to it, i.e., the more costly it is for the …rm to hire the other bank as its
underwriter.
Figure 2
This …gure plots the conversion rate of a Preferred Equity Redeemable Stock (PERCs), as a
function of the returns of the underlying common stock. Each unit of this preferred stock converts
mandatorily after 3 years to one unit of common stock unless the stock appreciates above a cap
of r percent: If after 3 years the common stock appreciates above the cap, PERCs convert to less
than one unit of common such that their conversion value is that of a stock that has appreciated
by r percent.
Figure 3
This …gure plots the probabilities that the next underwriting deal will be signed by either
the product innovator or its imitator. The next client that will be in the market seeking to sign
an underwriting deal is drawn a random from a uniform distribution. The solid line plots the
probability that theclient choosesto deal withtheinnovator, as a functionofthedi¤erencebetween
thequality of the underwriting provided by theinnovatoror theimitator. Thedashed lineplots the
probability that the client chooses the imitator as its underwriter. Ceteris paribus, if the innovator
and the imitator can o¤er the same quality underwriting then the probability that either gets the
next deal is 0.5. If the quality di¤erential is higher then the probability that the innovator gets
the next deal increases (and the imitator’s probability decreases). If the quality di¤erential is high
enough, any client will prefer the innovator, and the probability that he gets the next deal is one.
Figure 4
This …gure plots the expected pro…t per-deal for the next underwriting deal. The next client
that will be in the market seeking to sign an underwriting deal is drawn a random from a uniform
37distribution. Thesolid lineplotstheexpected pro…t per-deal fortheproduct innovatorasa function
of thedi¤erence between the quality of theunderwriting provided by the innovator or theimitator.
Thedashed line plots the imitator’s expected per-deal pro…ts. Ceteris paribus, if theinnovator and
the imitator can o¤er the same quality underwriting then each one gets the same expected pro…t.
Thisis thelowest pro…t that theinnovatorcan get, and thehighest expected pro…t for theimitator.
If the quality di¤erential is higher then the expected per-deal pro…ts of the innovator increase (and
the imitator’s pro…ts decrease). If the quality di¤erential is high enough, the imitator cannot o¤er
an attractive deal to any client and his pro…tsare zero. At thispoint, the innovator’s pro…t increase
much faster as quality increases.
Figure 5
This …gure plots the conversion rate of a Dividend Enhanced Convertible Stock (DECS), as a
function of the returns of the underlying common stock. Each unit of this preferred stock converts
mandatorily after 3 years to one unit of common stock unless the stock appreciates within 0 and r
percent: If the common stock appreciates within these boundaries in 3 years, then DECS convert
to less than one unit of common such that their conversion value is that of the stock’s price at the
issue date.
Figure 6
This …gure plots the empirical cumulative function of the speed at which a security is imitated.
Thespeed ofimitation ismeasured by thenumberofthe deal, in a chronological ordering, at which
a given security was imitated. A security is said to be imitated if a banker di¤erent from the
innovator also underwrites corporate issues using the same product structure. The dotted line is
theCDF corresponding to thoseimitatedsecuritiesthat were…rst generation products, i.e., the…rst
product in a sequence of related innovations. The solid line is the CDF of the speed of imitation
of products that appear in the sequence after the …rst generation.
Figure 7
This …gureplots theconversion rateof an Automatically ConvertibleEquity Securities (ACES),
as a function of the returns of the underlying common stock. Each unit of this preferred stock
converts mandatorily after 4 years to one unit of common stock if the common stock appreciates
between a ‡oor r and a cap r percent: If the common stock does not appreciate enough in 4 years,
38then ACES convert to more than one unit of common such that their conversion value is that of a
stock that appreciated r percent. If the common stock appreciates more than r percent in 4 years,
then ACES convert to less than one unit of common such that their conversion value is that of a
stock that appreciated r percent.
Figure 8
This …gure plots the conversion rate of a Participation Equity Preferred Stock (PEPS), as a
function of the returns of the underlying common stock. Each unit of this preferred stock converts
mandatorily after 4 years to one unit of common stock only if thecommon stock depreciates: If the
common stock appreciates, but less than r percent, then a unit of PEPS converts to less than one
unit of common such that their conversion value is that of the common stock at the date of issue.
The conversion rate, however, is ‡oored.
Figure 9
This Figure shows the probabilities that a security is not imitated before t days as from the
date of its …rst issue. The probability that imitation time, N; occurs after t, i.e., the survival
rates S(t) = Pr(N > t), are measured in the vertical axis and shown as a function of time,
which is shown in the horizontal axis. These are given by S(t) = ©(¡1
b ¾ ln(b ¸t)); where b ¸ is the
estimated imitation hazard rate, which is itself obtained from the estimated hazard rate model
b ¸ = exp (¡6:296+0:140¤ generation+0:001¤ sizeoffirstdeal); and b ¾ = 1:3124: The thick solid
plot corresponds to …rst generation securities. The thin solid plot correspondsto second generation
securities. The dashed plot corresponds to 5th generation securities and the dotted plot to 10th
generation securities.
Figure 10
ThisFigureplotstheestimatedmedian timesofimitation asa function ofthegeneration number
of the security. Themedian predicted time is shown on the vertical axis (Med t) and the generation
number, g; on the horizontal axis. The estimated median times, c M; are given by 1
b ¸; where b ¸ is
the estimated imitation hazard rate, which is itself obtained from the estimated hazard rate model
b ¸ =exp (¡6:296 +0:140 ¤generation+0:001 ¤sizeoffirstdeal): The thick solid plots the median
times when we use the 1st quartile of the sample distribution of the size of the …rst deal of the
security. The thin solid plot uses the median. The dashed plot uses the mean and the dotted plot
uses the 3rd quartile.
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41Footnotes
1. It is widely recognized that patents have been ine¤ective ways ofprotection from competition
by imitators in …nance. While it was always possible to obtain a patent on an innovative
corporate product, it was virtually impossible to enforce the patent before 1999, as most
…nancial innovations are considered “business methods or formulas”. Under patent laws,
businessmethodswereunpatentableuntil theUS SupremeCourt upheld a patent on a “busi-
ness method” in 1999. It is believed that the State Street Case has set the precedent required
to make patents e¤ective to protect R&D in …nancial products development.
2. Thorough surveys of innovations in corporate …nance instruments are provided by Peter
Tufano (Tufano, 1995) and John Finnerty (Finnerty, 1992). A more comprehensive survey
of …nancial innovation in general is provided by Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale (Allen and
Gale, 1994).
3. In a recent survey, Peter Tufano argues that many mechanisms that reward innovation still
remain to be studied (Tufano, 2003).
4. We could relax this extreme assumption to F0 > F1 > 0: This would only strengthen the
innovator’s advantage and not change at all the comparative statics.
5. Note that the price, p; is not the price at which the issue of the new security is sold by the
client to investors, but the price that the client pays to the bank (innovator or imitator) for
the engineering of the new security. It is thus the underwriting fee.
6. PERCs are shares of preferred stock that are mandatorily convertible to common stock after
3 years.
7. A notableexample ofan equity-linked bond is Salomon Brother’sinvention, theELK, a bond
whose face value is pegged to the appreciation of a chosen traded stock.
8. The case of the Put Warrants introduced by Goldman, Sachs & Co. in 1990 illustrates these
factors very well. Goldman pioneered the underwriting of US traded put options on foreign
market indices. Goldman started engineering put warrants on the Nikkei index to capitalize
on the desire by American investors to bet on the Nikkei’s fall. Later, deals included puts on
the French CAC-40. The deal also included a swap of the risk of exercise for a …xed payment
between the option writer and the underwriter, who had to hedge this risk himself:
429. The distribution of the time of innovation is geometric. Thus, if an event can occur inde-
pendently every period with a constant probability p, then the expected number of periods
before this event occurs is p¡1.
10. We can also allow for ±0 and ±1 to increase with every deal. This would speed up the
introduction of next generations even more.
11. Innovative corporate products were classi…ed by Schroth using a compilation of articles in
Investment Dealers’ Digest, American Banker, Dow Jones Newswires and others found using
theABI SearchEngine(seeSchroth, 2003). Forevery product, thereisat least onedescription
in these databases and a reference to an older product which was similar to it. Tom Pratt
writesadescriptivearticlein theInvestment Dealer’s Digest ofalmost every corporatesecurity
invented.
12. Themeasureof market share used here and by Schroth (Schroth, 2003) isthe number ofdeals
that a given bank has underwritten within a product or within a product group divided by
the respective total number of underwriting deals. Note that the measure is not the share of
the underwritten principal. Implicit is the assumption that the amount to …nance required
by an issuer is given at the time it has to choose its underwriter.
13. It is not clear yet who is patenting most intensively, i.e., top investment banks, small …rms,
independent software developers, and what is being patented, i.e., security designs, pricing
algorithms or trading platforms, after State Street. However, some top Wall Street …rms have
accumulated patents on tradeable securities lately. For example, Morgan Stanley patented a
…nancial instrument ofthe Equity-Linked class recently. A debt instrument called “OPALS”,
which is an equity-linked obligation secured by an underlying basket of stocks of a chosen
performance, and which provides tax advanatages to investors was awarded a patent in July
2000 (see “Data processing system and method for …nancial debt instruments,” US Patent
6’092,056). Also, Goldman Sachs obtained a patent in 1999 for a marketable security that
o¤ers selective exposureto the real estatemarket by backing its paymentswith real estateac-
countsswapped from selected REITs (see“System formanaging real estateSWAP accounts”,
US Patent 5’950,175).
14. Note that the model can be extended to allow for the case with a given larger number of
banks in a straightforward way, without a change in the results.
4315. Note too that having the banks spend R&D once and for all in time zero is equivalent as
letting them choose a continuous ‡ow of expenditures along the race.
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That is, the imitator updates the normal distribution of his estimator of a using the signals
from each observed deal and Bayes Rule, and the posterior precision of the imitator after t deals,





Since the developer receives the signal z0 =(a+"0) and hence has precision:
¿0 = A +¿
then the di¤erence in quality between innovator and imitator is:





Proposition 3 A larger initial clientele of the innovator relative to the imitator, results in higher
innovator’s pro…ts from the new security and lower pro…ts from imitation.
Proof. In all cases the innovators one period pro…ts are decreasing in ®. A small ® that is a
higher initial client base generates higher revenues from the innovation. Similarly for the imitator,
















45Proposition 4 There is a unique equilibrium to this innovation race. Theequilibrium is symmet-
ric, i.e., hA =hB = h. In the equilibrium, a higher degree of pro…t sharing implies a smaller
rate of innovation, i.e., h is decreasing in v.
Proof. The …rst-order conditions for both banks are
r(V ¡v) +hB(V ¡2v)
(r+hA +hB)
2 = e0 (hA)
r(V ¡v) +hA(V ¡2v)
(r+hA +hB)2 = e0 (hB)
Hence, de…ning the function H as
H(hA) ´
¡





r(V ¡v) +hB(V ¡2v)
¢
e0 (hB):
>From the …rst-order conditions, H(hA) = H(hB): Moreover, the function H is injective because
H0(hA) >0: Thus, it must bethat hA =hB, andthesymmetricequilibrium istheuniquecandidate.
The values of hA =hB = h must satisfy
r(V ¡v) = e0 (h)(r+2h)2 ¡h(V ¡2v)








The right hand side of the last expression is the product of two positive and increasing functions
so it is increasing in h (namely, (fg)
0 = f0g +fg0 > 0). Hence we have a unique value of h that
satis…es the equality, and a unique equilibrium where hA = hB. The second order condition for
either bank is always satis…ed
¡2
r(V ¡v) +h(V ¡2v)
(r+2h)
3 ¡e00 (h) <0:









Finally, by the implicit function theorem we have
h0 (v) = ¡Fv
Fh
<0:
46Proposition 5 A patent regime does not implement the optimal speed of innovation in the race
where the returns to R&D are decreasing.
Proof. The optimal rate of innovation h¤; is given by the best equilibrium value of h; i.e., the
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ACES (Automatically Convertible Equity Securities)
 - Innovator: Goldman Sachs, 9/1993.
 - Mandatory Conversion in 4 years.
 - High dividend yield (>7%).
r
Figure7: The conversion ratio of Automatically Convertible Securities (ACES) as a function of the






PEPS (Participation Equity Preferred Stock)
 - Innovator: Morgan Stanley, 3/1994.
 - Mandatory Conversion in 4 years.
 - High dividend yield (between 8.5% and 9%).
 -  r between 20 and 25%.
 -  x between 0.87 and 0.88.
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Figure8: The conversion ratio ofParticipation Equity Preferres Stock (PEPS) as a function of the
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Figure 9: The probability that a security is not imitated before date t after its …rst issue, con-
ditional on the generation number of the innovation. The thick solid plot corresponds to …rst
generation securities. The thin solid plot corresponds to second generation securities. The dashed
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Figure 10: The median times of imitation as a function of the generation number of the security,
estimated using a lognormal duration model. The thick solid plots the median times when we use
the 1st quartile of thesampledistribution of the size of the…rst deal of the security. The thin solid
plot uses the median. The dashed plot uses the mean and the dotted plot uses the 3rd quartile.
51Table 1: Number of Innovators and Competing Underwriters in All Product Groups of Equity
-Linked and Derivative Securities
Product Group Number of Products Number of Number of
(i.e., Generations) Distinct Innovators Underwriters
1. Debt Products 1 1 2
2. Convertible Debt (Zero Coupon) 1 1 3
3. Convertible Debt (Dividend Paying) 2 2 2
4. Convertible Preferred Stock 15 8 15
5. Short-term, Income-Deferring Products 1 1 4
6. Perpetual, Income-Deferring Products 9 4 9
7. Convertible, Income-Deferring Products 7 5 10
8. Index-Tied Principal Appreciation 8 5 8
9. Stock Tied-Principal Appreciation 4 4 6
10. Privatization Exchangeable Debt 1 1 1
11. Corporate Pass-throughs 1 1 1
Source: Schroth (2003).
52Table 2: Summary of the Empirical Evidence on First-Mover Advantages by Corporate Securities
Innovators
Study Description and Methodology E¤ect of Selected Variables
1. Tufano (1989) Regressions of underwriters historical
product market shares on
reduced form exogenous variables, including:
- a dummy variable for the innovator Positive and Signi…cant
2. Schroth (2003) Instrumental Variables estimations of the
issuers choice for an underwriter.
Choice depends on controls and:
- an innovator dummy Positive and Signi…cant
- innovator dummy interacting with time Negative and Signi…cant
- innovator dummy interaction with time
and generation number Negative and Signi…cant
53Table 3: Regression Analysis of the Duration before Securities are Imitated
Panel A
The dependent variable is the time in days elapsed after the …rst deal of the security was made.
Hazard Rate Model: ¡ln ¸= ¯0+¯1¤generation+¯2¤size of first deal +":
Weibull Exponential Lognormal Weibull Exponential Lognormal
Constant 6.374 6.467 5.822 6.735 6.776 6.296
(0.243)¤¤¤ (0.298)¤¤¤ (0.192)¤¤¤ (0.385)¤¤¤ (0.001)¤¤ (0.433)¤¤¤
Generation Number -0.097 -0.082 -0.130 -0.882 -0.0648 -0.140
(0.108) (0.129) (0.047)¤¤¤ (0.131)¤¤¤ (0.155) (0.061)¤¤
Size of First Deal -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(US$ Millions) (0.001)¤¤ (0.001)¤¤ (0.000)¤¤
No. of Imitated Securities 18 18 18 18 18 18
No. of Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48
Â2 Wald statistic 0.81 0.40 7.57¤¤¤ 4.18 3.88 7.88¤¤
Panel B
Hazard Rate: ¸ =exp (¡6:296+0:140¤ generation+0:001¤ size of first deal)
Median time of First Imitative Deal: M = 1
¸
Generation Median Time, evaluated at size of …rst deal =
Number 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile
1 415.90 341.36 278.77 193.36
5 237.60 195.01 159.26 110.47
10 118.01 96.86 79.10 54.87
15 58.61 48.11 39.29 27.25
Each observation in Panel A consists of the time in days after innovation, paired with the indicator of
whether the deal is by the innovator or not, the generation number and the size of the …rst deal. The panel
includes all 18 imitated equity-linked and derivative securities between 1985 and 2002. The parameters are
estimated by maximum likelihood, and the estimates of their standard errors are shown below them in
brackets. These estimates are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and within product group
correlation. Estimates followed by ¤¤¤ are signi…cant to the 0.01 level, by ¤¤ to the 005 level, and by ¤.to
the 0.1 level.
54Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Speed, Duration and Innovator’s Market Shares for the Innov-
ative Equity-Linked Securities
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Median
1. Market Share of Product Innovator First Generations 7 0.74 0.27 0.82
Later Generations 11 0.55 0.27 0.60
2. Speed of Imitation First Generations 7 4.86 2.48 4
(deal number of …rst imitation) Later Generations 11 2.91 0.83 3
3. Product Life (measured in deals) First Generations 11 19.81 28.16 9
Later Generations 39 11.39 18.47 5
The Market Share of the Product Innovator is the number of deals underwritten by the security
innovator divided by the total number of deals underwritten with that security. The Speed of
Imitation is the issue number (in chronological order) of the …rst deal by an imitator of a
given security. The Product Life is the total number of issues(underwriting deals) of a given
security.
55Table 5: Distribution of Imitated and Non-Imitated Products, Conditional on their Generation
Non-Imitated Products Imitated Products Total
1. First Generation Securities 4 7 11
36.36 63.64 100.00
2. Later Generations 29 11 39
72.50 27.50 100.00
Pearson Â2 = 4.9332; P-value: 0.026
There are 51 securities, 11 of which are a …rst generation product (one per group). The Pearson
Â2 statistic corresponds to the test whose null hypothesis is that there is no statistical
association between the two binary variables. The …rst row at each numeral shows the data counts;
the second the row percentages.
Table 6: Distribution of the Number of Innovations by Banks Competing in Each Product Group
Number of Innovations in the Product Group
Type of Banks 0 1 2 3 4 Total
1. Not the Group Innovator 28 16 3 1 2 50
56.00 32.00 6.00 2.00 4.00 100.00
2. Group Innovators 0 8 1 1 1 11
0 72.73 9.09 9.09 9.09 100.00
There are 61 bank-product group observations. 11 correspond to those banks that
developed the …rst generation in each group. The rest correspond to any other bank
that competed in the group, either as an imitator or an innovator of later generations.
The …rst row at each numeral shows the data counts; the second the row percentages.
56Table 7: Summary Statistics for the Share of Deals Underwritten by the Group Innovator
Observations Mean Std. Deviation
1. In groups with one generation only 5 0.74 0.36
2. In groups with more than one generation 6 0.41 0.23
Correlation with the Number of Generations in the Group 11 -0.624
The Group Market Share by the Group Innovator is the number of deals underwritten
by the developer of the …rst generation product, divided by the total number of deals in
the Product Group.
57Table 8: Bank’s Group Market Shares, Length of Sequence and Innovative Activity
The dependent variable is the share of a banks’s
underwritten deals of all securities in a given group.
Regressors Parameter estimates
Underwriter is Group Innovator 0:333¤¤¤
(Yes = 1) (0:096)
Number of Generations in Group ¡0:019¤¤¤
(0:005)
Total number of innovations by Underwriter 0:058¤¤¤






The market shares are calculated using all the o¤erings of equity-linked and derivative securities
between 1985 and 2001. Each observation consists of a bank’s share of deals in the group, paired
with the identity of the banker as the innovator of the group (Yes or No), the number of innovations
to follow in the group (generations) and the number of times the bank innovated in the same group.
The parameters are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares and their standard errors are obtained
by computed the Huber-White hesteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator. Estimates
followed by ¤¤¤ are signi…cant to the 0.01 level, by ¤¤ to the 0.05 level, and by ¤ to the 0.1 level.
58Table 9: List of Innovating and Imitating Banks in the Class of Perpetual, Deferrable-Income
Securities
Innovations in Perpetual, Deferrable-Income, Securities
Generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Security MIPS EPICS MIDS TOPRS QIDS QUIPS QUICS RST-CAPS COPRS
Innovatora GS BEAR GS LEH GS GS LEH LEH ML
Imitators ML ML SAL ML ML
SB MS SB MS SB
UBS
a The bank acronyms above are: GS = Goldman Sachs, ML = Merrill Lynch, SB = Smith Barney,
BEAR = Bear Stearns, MS = Morgan Stanley, LEH = Lehman Brothers, SAL = Salomon Brothers,
UBS = UBS Securities.
The data is found within the issues of equity-linked and derivative corporate securities between 1985
and 2002.
59Table10: List ofInnovating and Imitating Banksin the Class of Index-Tied Principal Appreciation
Securities
Index-Tied Principal Appreciation Securities
Generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Security PERLS SIRS SMARTS MITTS EPS CPNS SUNS CUBS
Innovatora MS UNK ML ML ML ML LEH BEAR
Imitators GS PW GS GS
OP LEH
a The bank acronyms are: GS = Goldman Sachs, ML = Merrill Lynch, PW = Paine Webber,
BEAR = Bear Stearns, MS = Morgan Stanley, LEH = Lehman Brothers, OP = Operaciones,
UNK = unknown.
The data is found within the issues of equity-linked and derivative corporate securities between 1985
and 2002.
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